Abstract: Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen has recently urged enactment of a congressional statute that would limit the judicial use of precedent in constitutional cases. Although I share Professor Paulsen's general views on precedent, his proposed statute is unconstitutional. Congress does not have power to regulate by statute the decisionmaking processes of federal courts, even when those decisionmaking processes are themselves unconstitutional. Congress' sole remedy is impeachment and removal of judges who improperly decide cases. This assessment of congressional power calls into question many familiar practices, such as statutes regulating scope of review, statutes prescribing rules of evidence for courts, and statutes regulating judicial remedies.
to control the judicial decisionmaking process. 4 Given the relative importance of questions concerning control of jurisdiction and control of decisionmaking, the widespread neglect of the latter is noteworthy.
There are signs, however, that congressional regulation of the judicial process may finally be attracting significant academic attention. In recent years, four of the nation's most insightful constitutional scholars have addressed some aspect of this topic. In 1995, Professor Martin H.
Redish concluded, as part of a wide-ranging study of judicial independence, that Congress has broad power to prescribe substantive and procedural rules for the judiciary but that separation-ofpowers principles place important limits on that power when its exercise affects the way in which cases are decided. 5 According to Professor Redish, the decisional independence principle precludes direct legislative control of judicial outcomes, 6 while the political commitment principle 7 forbids Congress from using the trappings and prestige of the federal courts to hide substantive legislative decisions from the electorate. 
(1995)
. 6 See id. at 707-14. 7 This principle requires that legislation carry "some meaningful level of normative political commitment by the enacting legislators, thus enabling the electorate to judge its representatives." Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure 136 (1995). 8 For example, Professor Redish argues that if Congress adopts standard "A" as a substantive rule of decision, it cannot then regulate the judicial decisionmaking process in a way that effectively requires "B" as the outcome in adjudications -even if Congress could have directly prescribed "B" as the governing substantive standard. See Redish, supra note 5, at 715-16. Cf. Lawrence G. Sager, Klein's First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 Geo. L.J. 2525, 2529 (1998) (suggesting that United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), stands for the analogous principle that "[t]he judiciary will not permit its articulate authority to be subverted to serve ends antagonistic to its actual judgment; the judiciary will resist efforts to make it seem to support and regularize that with which it in fact disagrees").
In 1999, Professor David Engdahl identified the sweeping clause of article I, section 8 9 as the constitutional source of congressional power to regulate the jurisdictional, structural, and decisional affairs of the federal courts. 10 Professor Engdahl urges courts to decide for themselves whether congressional measures regulating the judiciary in fact aid or hinder the "carrying into Execution" of the judicial power, which he argues calls into question the validity of such familiar statutes as the Anti-Injunction Act, some of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and a host of other measures designed to regulate the remedies and procedures employed by the federal courts.
11
Two recent articles specifically consider the power of Congress to regulate the use of precedent by federal courts. Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen has urged adoption of a statute that would forbid the federal courts from giving prior court decisions any weight beyond their persuasive value in future cases involving the constitutionality of abortion regulations (or in constitutional cases more generally). 12 He agrees with Professor Engdahl that the sweeping clause is the key constitutional provision for analyzing congressional power over the courts, but he finds in that clause a power at least broad enough to restrict the use of precedent in constitutional cases. 13 And Professor John Harrison has argued for a similar, though perhaps 9 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (declaring that Congress shall have power "[t] make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof"). Professor Engdahl, in accordance with modern practice, calls this clause the "necessary and proper clause. " The founding generation, however, uniformly termed it the "sweeping clause."
10 See Engdahl, supra note 1. 11 See id. at 158-74. . 13 See id. at 1590-94.
narrower, congressional power under the sweeping clause to mandate any norm of precedent that courts could reasonably adopt for themselves.
14 All of these authors make critical contributions to an exploration of this issue, but each of them misses an important piece of the puzzle. Professor Redish correctly draws attention to the importance of background norms of separation of powers, but he does not discuss the central role played by the sweeping clause in any assessment of congressional power to regulate the courts.
Professor Engdahl neatly articulates the role of the sweeping clause, but his analysis of that clause is incomplete. Professor Engdahl emphasizes the requirement that laws regulating the judiciary must be "for carrying into Execution" the judicial power, but he pays scant attention to the separate requirement that such laws be "necessary and proper" for that purpose. As I have elsewhere explained at length, in conjunction with Patricia B. Granger, the term "proper" in the sweeping clause is an important limitation on the scope of the power granted to Congress by that clause. 15 Professor Paulsen places the issue of congressional power in its appropriate practical and historical context and recognizes the need to take account of the word "proper" in the sweeping clause, but he fails to see that the term "proper" draws much of its content from background separation-of-powers principles, more or less (to complete the circle) in accordance with Professor Redish's analysis. Professor Harrison similarly does not give due regard to the extent to which separation-of-powers concerns, and in particular Professor Redish's principle of decisional independence, are codified in the sweeping clause.
14 John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, --Duke L.J. -(2000) (forthcoming). Professor Harrison's analysis may lead to a narrower view of congressional power than does Professor Paulsen's because the former pays more attention than the latter to the requirement that congressional statutes actually "carry[] into Execution" the judicial power. On the other hand, this may be more a difference of focus than of substance. What is needed for a full exploration of Congress' power to regulate the affairs of the federal courts is a (no pun intended) proper synthesis that gives due account to the text of the sweeping clause, the background norms that animate it, and the structural and historical context in which it is located. The result of that synthesis is that Professor Paulsen's proposed precedent-limiting statute is clearly unconstitutional; Congress may not by statute tell the federal courts whether or in what way to use precedent. 16 I do not reach that conclusion because of any great fondness for the doctrine of stare decisis. As Professor Paulsen notes, 17 he and I are among the tiny handful of academics who think it is affirmatively unconstitutional for federal courts to rely on precedent in constitutional cases. 18 Nonetheless, Congress does not have the power to tell the federal courts how to go about their business of deciding cases, even if the courts' own methods for deciding cases (such as reliance on precedent) are unconstitutionally wrong. This does not mean that the federal courts' use of precedent or other decisionmaking methodologies is therefore uncontrollable. To the contrary, the Constitution prescribes two very important, and very powerful, methods for controlling the actions of the federal courts. But the enactment of a congressional statute along Professor Paulsen's lines is not one of them. Paulsen's proposed statute exceeds those limits. Part III applies that analysis to some of the existing statutes -several with very impressive pedigrees -that currently regulate the decisionmaking practices of the federal courts. Part IV then briefly sets forth the two constitutionally permissible methods for controlling the decisionmaking methodologies of the federal courts.
I
Five preliminary points set the framework for a correct understanding of congressional power to regulate the affairs of the federal courts. First, this article seeks to determine the original meaning of the various clauses in the Constitution that define and limit the power of Congress to regulate judicial decisionmaking. Under my strict originalist approach (which is markedly stricter than the approach employed by most originalists), the search for original meaning is precisely that: it is not a search for explanations or justifications of current or past doctrine. Court decisions and legislative and executive practices are neither constitutive nor generally good evidence of constitutional meaning, and I treat them accordingly. Moreover, I make no normative claims about the extent to which original meaning should guide decisions.
Originalism, as I apply it here, is a theory of interpretation, not a theory of adjudication. 19 What people do with the Constitution's meaning once they have it is their own business.
Although the participants in this debate have a substantial range of methodological disagreements, they share enough common premises to let the game proceed without a more extensive discussion of methodology (though I will address some fine points along the way). 21 The differences are small because Professors Redish and Engdahl do not seek to superimpose on the Constitution's structural design some theory of government radically different from that embodied in the original document. Accordingly, the inferences that they draw from the constitutional structure are not grossly different from the inferences that would be drawn by a strict originalist. The gap between originalists and Professors Redish and Engdahl could be much larger on other issues in which, for example, the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment plays a central role. Professors Redish and Engdahl also depart significantly from an originalist understanding of the scope of Congress' powers under the commerce clause and sweeping clause, but that may reflect more a difference in application than in underlying methodology.
someone enters this debate from a widely divergent perspective, but there will be time enough to address those concerns if and when it becomes necessary. Paulsen is correct that the Constitution adopts a specific, blended scheme for allocating governmental power rather than some pure theoretical model 39 and that one must be careful to avoid reading overly general conceptions of separation of powers into the Constitution. But there is simply no way to understand, for example, the "executive" and "judicial" powers or the scope of congressional authority to regulate the execution of these powers without reference to theoretical background norms about the Constitution's separation of powers. One can criticize particular conclusions about how broadly or narrowly the background separation-of-powers norms cut, but that does not mean that some such norms do not operate at a constitutional level.
Nor are such norms "freestanding." A "proper" separation of powers argument is as fully textual Rev. 125, 201 (raising this objection in connection with "proper" principles of federalism). That is a separate topic, but the short answer is threefold. First, the sweeping clause gives these background principles textual grounding, if one cares about such things (as Professor Paulsen and I do). It is, as Professor Paulsen intimates, more difficult to claim constitutional status for a free-standing norm than to use such norms to interpret language that is well structured to receive them. Second, channeling the inquiry through a text shapes the inquiry into the appropriate background norms. Third, if the sweeping clause is the primary vehicle through which these norms are constitutionalized, then the norms may not apply (or may not apply in the same way) to legislation enacted pursuant to the District or territories/property clauses or by direct exercises of the other article I, section 8 powers. Start with some easy cases. Congress clearly has the power to affect the process of judicial decisionmaking in many ways. Courts, for example, must apply valid congressional statutes as substantive law in cases to which they apply and even give them preference over many other sources of substantive law with which they may conflict. 42 What else could "legislative Powers" possibly mean? Thus, whenever it enacts a substantive statute, Congress controls to some extent -and possibly to a dispositive extent -how courts will decide cases.
It is just as clear, however, that Congress cannot enact a statute instructing a federal court to decide a specific case in a specific way. Everyone, including Professor Paulsen, agrees with this much. 43 Nor could Congress pass a general statute providing, for example, that in any case raising a question concerning the constitutionality of a statute restricting abortion, the court must rule for/against the plaintiff.
Why not? Why can't Congress tell the federal courts how to decide specific cases, or classes of cases, given that Congress has the undoubted power to determine to a large extent the substantive law that courts must apply? Perhaps discovering the true reasons for the obvious can help us analyze the non-obvious.
One wrong turn is to say that such an outcome-directing statute would violate the fifth amendment by depriving the losing party of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law," 44 because due process of law requires a fair chance to win in an impartial forum. This is right as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. the case were not "life, liberty, or property," then Congress could direct the outcome even in a particular case. 45 Furthermore, it would mean that Congress only lost the power to direct case outcomes in 1791, when the fifth amendment was ratified. Neither conclusion is unthinkable, but both are odd enough to give one pause.
The due process clause is simply the wrong place to look for answers to these kinds of problems. The bill of rights today is usually the first resort for a limitation on congressional power when, as an original matter, it should be second in line. The Constitution limits the power of federal institutions primarily through the scheme of enumerated powers. The bill of rights in 1791 did not significantly alter the legal landscape; it merely clarified, and to a very limited extent expanded, the range of limitations on the federal government that was already part of the constitutional design in 1789. 46 Outside of federal territories and enclaves, very few statutes were constitutional in 1790 but unconstitutional in 1792.
Instead of running to the due process clause, we should first look to the scheme of enumerated powers. The place to begin an inquiry concerning the powers of the federal judiciary is with the enumerated powers --or, more precisely, the enumerated power --of the federal judiciary. The only clause that affirmatively empowers the federal judiciary to act in a judicial capacity is the vesting clause of article III, which states that "[t]he judicial Power of the United
States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such inferior Courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 47 Any power exercised by a federal court must stem either from this grant of the "judicial Power" or from a federal statute that is "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" the judicial power.
Historical research tells us almost nothing about what this "judicial Power" was likely to be understood to entail in 1789. 48 Professor Paulsen notes, for example, that the claim that the judicial power "includes the power to vest precedent with authoritative, decision-altering weight, independent of its persuasiveness" 49 was not made "by anyone in the Constitutional Convention;
nor by any prominent (or even obscure) framer or ratifier at the time of the drafting, debate over, and early implementation of the Constitution; nor even by any prominent opponent in the ratification debates or Anti-Federalist literature." 50 This is not a surprising conclusion; one could say the same about virtually every proposition concerning the meaning of the "judicial Power."
"The judicial Power" simply was not a term that received serious attention during the founding period. 51 Nor does the silence necessarily reflect consensus. The "judicial Power" in 1789 was not a term with a lengthy, well-understood history. Indeed, the notion of "judicial Power" as a 48 Lest one lose focus, one must always remember that originalism is a search for hypothetical rather than actual historical understanding. See supra note 20. But history is not irrelevant; it is generally hard to determine what a hypothetical audience would have thought without reference to what real audiences actually thought. 49 Paulsen, supra note 12, at 1571. distinct aspect of governmental power, rather than as a manifestation of legislative or executive power, was a relatively recent innovation in the late eighteenth century. 52 About all that we can say with certainty about the "judicial Power" is that it is the power to decide cases in accordance with governing law. 53 But why isn't a law that directs the outcome in a case part of that governing law? After all, to say that courts have the power to decide cases is not necessarily to say that no other institution can guide, or even direct, that power. The
Constitution does not expressly say that "no other Institution of the federal Government shall instruct the Courts in their Exercise of the judicial Power." Indeed, the sweeping clause provides superficially plausible grounds for claiming the contrary.
The reason that Congress cannot direct the outcome in a particular case (or class of cases)
is that such a law would not be "necessary and proper" for carrying into execution the judicial power. It probably fails even a generous test of necessity. And it would not be "proper" because it would violate a constitutional background norm that says that each department of the national government must be independent of the other departments in its exercise of enumerated functions unless the Constitution directs otherwise. 54 That principle, in turn, is gleaned from our 54 One could also try to say that such a law would not really be "for carrying into Execution" the judicial power. That assumes, however, that the judicial power includes an independent power to reach legal conclusions without legislative direction, which is precisely the proposition about to be established. Once one has established that proposition, the requirement that executory laws actually carry the judicial power into execution begins to have bite.
Where the text of the Constitution directs a particular allocation of governmental power, that allocation must be respected --even when that allocation violates pure theoretical conceptions of separated powers (as is arguably the case, for example, with the presentment clause of article I, section 7, which gives the executive a direct role in the legislative process).
But what happens when the text is silent? One possible answer is that the sweeping clause gives
Congress authority to fill in all gaps without limitation. 55 Another possible answer, however, is that there are certain background principles that define the "proper" allocation of powers in the absence of direct constitutional specification. The latter answer is overwhelmingly more plausible. The whole point of vesting three distinct kinds of governmental power in three distinct institutions is to create independent power centers. Just as the vesting clauses generate a principle of departmental coordinacy, under which each department has a distinct obligation to construe the laws and Constitution, 56 they also generate a principle of departmental independence, under which each department should be understood to operate outside the direct control of other departments unless the Constitution instructs to the contrary. This principle of departmental independence is, at a minimum, a good starting point for determining whether a statutory allocation of power is constitutionally "proper" when the Constitution is otherwise silent. What if the substantive law does not directly command a decision for one party but is so narrowly tailored that it effectively prescribes the outcome for a pending case or ongoing controversy? This is a swamp that I had hoped to avoid until a subsequent article, but two commentators on this manuscript have pushed me into it here.
The nondelegation doctrine, in its originalist form, limits the extent to which statutes can leave important issues unresolved. 67 Does the Constitution also impose a maximum as well as a minimum degree of specificity on regulatory statutes? The Constitution's prohibitions on bills of 65 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 51, at 754 n.271. 66 See id. How strongly it supports the principle depends on how much weight one want to assign to this kind of Convention maneuvering and how confidently one can trust the historical records. The short answers are, respectively, "not that much" and "tolerably well when the result coheres with other sources." On the latter point, see James H. 74 Why can't one simply say that the principle of decisional independence is part of the "judicial Power" (and the "executive Power"), and thus limits Congress' authority, with or without reference to the sweeping clause? One probably can, but only up to a point. If there was a thick, well understood conception of the judicial power in the late eighteenth century, one could avoid most of these questions simply by reference to that conception. But there was not, so any background principles that do not find textual expression must operate at a fairly high level of generality. That poses the "Paulsen problem" of letting free-standing norms run amok. The Constitution is an "impure" compromise that is certainly based on understandings about separated powers but does not uniformly embody a single coherent theory. For example, the presentment clauses give the President some degree of legislative power, the President of the Senate clause does the same for the Vice President, and the appointments clause gives courts some measure of the executive/legislative appointment power. More pointedly, the sweeping clause expressly authorizes Congress to legislate with respect to the other departments' powers. That express authorization limits the extent to which one can say that the very nature of the judicial and executive powers precludes legislative interference; the Constitution quite obviously contemplates some measure of interference, regardless of what some "pure" theory might tell us. The question then becomes what degree of departure from purity the Constitution contemplates, and that question can only be answered by carefully examining the enumerated powers that permit interference. Perhaps one can derive a rule against direct legislative control of judicial (or executive) outcomes from the very existence of a scheme of separated powers, but any limitations on legislation that stray very far from that extreme probably need some "internal" constitutional grounding -even if those internal norms direct our attention to external understandings. Hence, the "necessary and proper" and "for carrying into Execution" requirements of the sweeping clause must do most of the heavy work in structural constitutional analysis.
pose a special puzzle. The statute at issue in Robertson, which essentially defined certain timber harvesting activities as compliant with applicable federal laws, regulated timber harvesting on federal lands and was thus an exercise of the property clause power. Perhaps one can read a specificity requirement into that clause's authorization of "needful Rules and Regulations respecting the . . . Property belonging to the United States," U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added), but that is a much tougher task than finding such a requirement in the sweeping clause. Does this mean that Congress can prescribe judicial outcomes under the District or territories/property clauses? (Such a statute clearly could not be a direct exercise of any of Congress' other powers.) The answer is a somewhat involved "no (or at least mostly no)." If one can simply rule out direct legislative control of judicial outcomes as inherent in a scheme of separated powers, see supra note 74, then the question is easy. If not, matters get complicated. Prior to 1791, the unqualified language of the District clause arguably did permit Congress to control judicial outcomes, though such a statute probably would not have survived even the minimal requirement of needfulness under the territories/property clause. The ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 had some interesting, and probably unintended, effects on Congress' power over the District, territories, and federal property. The first nine amendments extended some of the principles of limited government into the otherwise general legislative authority of Congress over these areas. To the extent that life, liberty, or property are at stake in the litigation, the extension of due process principles to the District and territories might well forbid legislative control of judicial judgments. And in cases that do not involve life, liberty, or property, the question turns on whether one can fairly characterize the right to a judicial decision that is not predetermined as a "right[] . . . retained by the people." U.S. Const. amend. IX.
provisions, those provisions must be enacted pursuant to the sweeping clause, and one must then ask whether it is "proper" to authorize enforcement of a statute that violates norms of generality (if indeed the substantive statute does so). As for the other article I, section 8 powers: some of them seem to require by their terms some measure of generality, 76 others contemplate highly specific legislation, 77 and still others are ambiguous. 78 A full study of this question thus requires a careful analysis of each of Congress' enumerated powers -which is one of the many reasons that I do not want to say any more about it here.
So Congress can (to an extent) provide the federal courts with substantive law but cannot directly command the outcome of a case. What about the identification of the relevant facts and law and the process of reasoning to a case outcome? Is that process of decisionmaking subject to congressional control by statute?
The judicial power of course includes the power to reason to the outcome of a case. One cannot decide cases without bringing to bear some decisionmaking methodology for identifying and applying the relevant facts and law, so a grant of the judicial power must include a grant of the power to reason from facts and law to conclusions. Can Congress control that reasoning power by using the sweeping clause to dictate the decisionmaking methodology that courts must employ? The answer, as an inference from the principle of departmental independence, must be no. The process of decisionmaking is so tied up with the process of reaching a decision that it must be the "proper" province of the judicial department in the same way and to the same degree 76 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States"). 77 See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (giving Congress power "[t]o establish Post Offices and post Roads"). 78 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (authorizing Congress "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces").
as the power to reach an outcome. Indeed, it is almost silly to say that the core of the judicial power is merely the power to reach a result, without reference to the process by which that result is reached. Accordingly, Congress can pass substantive laws, but it cannot tell the courts how to identify, construe, and apply them. And because we are dealing with a simple absence of congressional power, the purported justification for the exercise of the power is irrelevant. Even if the courts are applying a wrongheaded, or even unconstitutionally wrongheaded, method of decisionmaking, the sweeping clause does not empower Congress to prescribe a different process.
This conclusion straightforwardly rules out a statute regulating the courts' use of precedent. The proof of any proposition, including propositions of law, requires three elements: Professor Paulsen's case against this "structural argument,"as he aptly terms it, is as elegantly simple as the argument itself: (1) unless the Constitution prescribes a specific methodology, such as a specific method for assigning weight to precedent, the choice of a methodology is ultimately a judgment of policy, and judge-made policies cannot prevail over congressional statutes, (2) the structural argument leads to an unchecked judiciary, which is "at odds with the Constitution's most fundamental structural postulate," 80 and (3) the structural argument is inconsistent with a wide range of doctrinal understandings, including some from the founding era. In Part IV of this article, I will demonstrate that proposition (2) is incorrect.
Proposition (3) is correct, but it is relevant to this argument only to the extent that it bears on original meaning. In Part III, I will show that Professor Paulsen's doctrinal examples say little about original meaning.
The essence of Professor Paulsen's critique of the structural argument is therefore proposition (1), which is nicely summed up in the following passage:
The [structural] argument claims the existence of penumbral judicial powers to prescribe rules of policy that trump the rules of law that the courts would otherwise find to be contained in the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States. Unless the argument is that the Constitution dictates a specific doctrine of stare decisis --and neither the courts nor any credible scholar has ever made such a claim, to my knowledge --the claim would have to be that the judiciary is constitutionally empowered to devise one of its own choosing, without limitation, by virtue of Article III's grant of "[t]he judicial Power" and the idea of separation of powers generally. That is pushing penumbras too far and misusing the idea of separation of powers. Apart from the last sentence, Professor Paulsen has it exactly right. The federal courts have precisely the power to choose decisionmaking methodologies free of statutory control. If one wants to call that power "penumbral" rather than, say, "derived from background principles that define the 'proper' scope of Congress' power to legislate for other departments," so be it. And if one wants to call the prescription of decisionmaking methodologies a matter of "policy" rather than, say, "the determination of meta-norms for lawfinding and factfinding," so be that too.
The stakes in this debate are quite high. Suppose that Congress enacts a statute that says: 83 82 See id. at 1579 n.119. 83 Professor Paulsen suggests that there may be a disanalogy between presidential powers under article II and judicial powers under article III if the "executive Power" by its nature contains an element of discretion that is not present in the "judicial Power." See id. at 1580 n.119. That is certainly true, but it has a boomerang effect on Professor Paulsen's argument. If the judiciary does not have discretion to choose decisionmaking methodologies under article III, then the choice of a methodology must be a matter of constitutional command rather than of nonconstitutional policy, which undermines Professor Paulsen's case for congressional power. In fact, however, there are inescapable elements of discretion under both article II and article III. There may be differences in the degree of discretion, but I doubt whether Professor Paulsen wants to drawn constitutional distinctions based on those differences in degree.
I am quite confident that Professor Paulsen would endorse a constitutional power in
Congress to enact each of these statutes (or if he objected, the objection would involve the specific form or content of the statute and another could be drawn up that did not raise those concerns). I am equally persuaded that both statutes are "improper" and therefore unconstitutional. Our difference, quite bluntly, is that I believe that the sweeping clause is a textual vehicle for implementing the principle of departmental independence, while Professor
Paulsen views such a principle as a free-floating abstraction without constitutional grounding.
The ultimate question is therefore: who is right about the sweep of the sweeping clause with respect to congressional statutes affecting the allocation of power among federal institutions?
With all due respect, the case for departmental independence is at least as strong as the case for departmental coordinacy, which Professor Paulsen has developed so thoughtfully in his prior work. The principle of departmental independence is part of the "proper" allocation of powers under the federal Constitution. That principle entails an independent judicial power to ascertain, interpret, and apply the relevant law. Congress cannot tell courts how to reason any more than it can tell courts how to decide. Procedure Act, 86 and the numerous organic statutes that prescribe a scope of review for appeals 84 Just how much such enactments should count in determining original public meaning is a question that can be answered only in the context of a detailed specification of the mechanics of a jurisprudence of original public meaning. For now, it is enough to note that they are surely admissible evidence, even if they ultimately prove to be of little significance.
85 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 52(a) (stating that findings of fact of federal district courts "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous"). Congress routinely legislates concerning the remedies that federal courts can employ.
The most obvious example is the Anti-Injunction Act, 95 which dates back to 1793. 96 Professor
Paulsen relies on this early example of congressional regulation as support for his broad reading of the sweeping clause. 97 When all is said and done, it may well be that the power to award a remedy is so bound up with the power to decide a case that Congress has no more power to regulate remedies than to regulate the decisionmaking process. 98 The differences between determining liability and determining remedies, however, are large enough so that evidence of practice with respect to remedies counts for little, if anything, concerning original understandings of congressional power to regulate more direct aspects of the case-deciding process, such as the use of precedent.
Similarly, statutes abrogating prudential standing doctrines, which Professor Paulsen regards as "perhaps the most direct analogy to a statute abrogating stare decisis," 99 tell us nothing about original understanding. Not only are the statutes concerning prudential standing a twentieth-century invention, but the prudential standing doctrine itself is a twentieth-century invention of highly dubious character. 100 Moreover, standing goes to the power of a court to hear the case, not to the manner in which a case within the court's jurisdiction should be decided. Consider what appears to be the simplest case: congressional statutes that regulate the standard of proof that courts must employ. Numerous statutes providing for judicial review of federal agency action specify that certain kinds of agency decisions must be given some measure of deference by reviewing courts. Factual findings of administrative agencies are almost always subject to statutorily-mandated deferential review, and policy decisions may be reversed only if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 105 The specification of a standard of proof is an essential part of the judicial decisionmaking process, so these statutes represent a direct challenge to the principle of decisional independence. Indeed, they are hard to distinguish from a statute that flatly requires decision in favor of a specific party. There is not much distance between "decide the case in favor of X" and "decide the case in favor of X unless you determine that X's position approaches lunacy." Are all such statutes unconstitutional?
The straightforward answer is yes, but the path to that answer is far from clear. under each substantive statute. The legislative power includes the power to determine (to some extent) the sphere of activity over which the executive power acts, but once that sphere is determined, the executive power is self-executing. Similarly, Congress has some power (how much it is unnecessary to say here) to determine the jurisdiction of the various federal courts, but once that jurisdiction is conferred and the judicial power's sphere of activity is established, that power is self-executing. 111 Accordingly, the power to authorize suit, to the extent that such power exists in Congress, carries with it no ancillary power to prescribe the manner in which such suits must be heard and decided. Any such congressional power must find authorization in the sweeping clause and therefore must be "necessary and proper" for effectuating the federal judicial power.
112
In any event, many statutes prescribing standards of proof do not involve suits against the government. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for instance, obligates federal appellate courts to defer to findings of fact by district courts unless those findings are "clearly erroneous." 113 This standard purports to govern all civil suits, including suits between private parties and suits in which the government is the plaintiff. One therefore cannot escape the need to determine the constitutionality of legislatively-specified standards of proof.
111 On the self-executing character of the judicial power, see Engdahl, supra note 1, at 83-90. 112 One could reach the same results by applying some variant of the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, which forbids Congress from doing indirectly what it may not do directly. The precise contours, origins, and viability of that doctrine is a matter of ongoing controversy. Put less delicately, the subject is an odoriferous swamp. In one memorable two-year period, the doctrine generated, without any resolution, two major articles in the decisions with respect to any "fact found by a jury." 118 And this is apart from the background assumptions of the surrounding legal order, which obviously sought to distinguish law from fact for many important legal purposes, as our legal system continues to do today. One must therefore take very seriously the idea that the Constitution places greater limits on congressional power to regulate the judicial decisionmaking process with respect to law-finding than with respect to fact-finding.
In the end, I would conclude that Professor Paulsen is right that law-finding and factfinding are equally fundamental to the judicial process, but with a sense of unease that might prompt reconsideration. behind. Subject only to some lingering doubts about the constitutional significance of a law-fact distinction in this context, the unavoidable conclusion is that these statutes are unconstitutional.
The process of reasoning to a decision involves formulating and applying rules of admissibility, rules of significance, and standards of proof. If Congress can regulate any stage of this process, it can effectively shape the process of decisionmaking. The principle of decisional independence forbids this. Nor can Congress mandate that courts apply specific presumptions; a presumption is a direct regulation of the significance of certain pieces of evidence. And that is true whether or not the presumption is "irrebuttable."
Rules of procedure, however, are another matter. There is no question that procedure can affect substance, so that seemingly "procedural" rules can have an impact on substantive decisionmaking. The fact is familiar from many contexts. 120 Nonetheless, the distinction between substance and procedure is deeply engrained in our legal system. Procedural rules concerning such matters as forms of pleading, methods for executing judgments, empanelling of juries, etc. are surely precisely the kinds of laws "for carrying into Execution" the judicial power that the sweeping clause is designed to authorize. It is possible, of course, for some of these procedural rules to affect the process of decisionmaking in fairly direct ways; the order in which proof must be presented, for example, surely has the potential to affect decisions. How can we tell whether a congressional regulation of judicial procedure trenches so deeply into the decisionmaking process that it violates the principle of judicial independence?
Professors Engdahl and Redish have conveniently provided the solution. Professor
Engdahl points out that any congressional regulations of judicial procedure must, by an objective standard, be "for carrying into Execution" the judicial power. 121 If the rule hinders rather than helps the execution of the judicial power, it is unconstitutional. Professor Redish adds that such procedural rules would be unconstitutional if they "so interfere with the courts' performance of the judicial function . . . as to invade the courts' 'judicial power' under Article III." 122 Although that proposition may sound absurdly circular ("a congressional rule unconstitutionally intrudes on the judicial power if it so intrudes on the judicial power as to be unconstitutional"), it is as sound a formulation of what is a "proper" procedural statute as we will find. This kind of circularity is common, and unavoidable, in many separation-of-powers contexts. For instance, the correct test for whether a statute vesting policymaking discretion in the executive is an improper, and therefore unconstitutional, delegation of legislative power is: "Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them." 123 An "officer of the United States" under the appointments clause is, essentially, any employee who is important enough to be called an "officer of the United
States." 124 A principal officer under the appointments clause is, essentially, an officer who is important enough to be considered principal. 125 There are matters for which the Constitution simply does not provide a bright line rule, so that one cannot avoid the exercise of judgment based on shades and degrees. The point at which procedural rules slip into substantive regulations of judicial decisionmaking is one of them. Accordingly, procedural rules must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they unduly regulate the decisionmaking process.
126
That leaves congressional regulation of judicial remedies. The fashioning of a remedy is an essential aspect of deciding a case. 127 A law expanding the range of potential remedies available to a court is hard to challenge, but a law restricting a court's power to apply its Professor Paulsen raises the specter of an "uncontrollable judiciary" 132 and "an uncheckable judicial power to prescribe rules at variance with the Constitution," 133 which suggests that the alternative to his statute is a regime in which courts are free to choose any method of decisionmaking, and any theory of precedent, without external control. This is not true. Even without Professor Paulsen's statute, the Constitution prescribes two methods for controlling judicial use of precedent or any other decisionmaking methodology. Professor
Paulsen even alludes to these methods, both of which are near and dear to his (and my) heart. 138 See id. at 1308-09.
139 How "egregiously" must the judges flaunt the law in order to trigger the possibility of impeachment? That is a topic for another article, which I have no plans or desire to write. It is enough for now to establish that decisionmaking methodologies are fair game in principle for the impeachment power and that a consistent pattern of application of faulty methodologies is an impeachable offense, even if a single, random faulty decision would not be. 140 See Redish, supra note 20. 141 See id. at 685-86.
historical, however, it is not impossible that even an established understanding could be wrong --because, for example, it failed to grasp certain essential features of the overall constitutional structure. Accordingly, Professor Redish's position cannot be casually dismissed by originalists.
But if one is going to bring constitutional principles to bear on this inquiry (and one should), the principle of coordinacy, which is as fundamental as the principle of decisional independence, cuts in favor of the rather clear original understanding of the impeachment power. If it is unlikely that the Constitution, with its careful scheme of divided power, permits Congress to control the process of judicial decisionmaking by statute, it is just as unlikely that the Constitution provides no mechanism at all for controlling rogue judicial decisionmaking.
If courts are indeed abusing the doctrine of precedent, then Congress can control that abuse through the impeachment process -with all of the cumbersome mechanisms that that process entails. But Congress can no more circumvent its responsibilities to police the judicial department under the impeachment clauses by passing ordinary legislation than it can circumvent its responsibilities to police the executive department under the impeachment power by passing ordinary legislation, such as laws providing for independent counsels.
Second, the President has the power to control judicial abuses of precedent through the power to refuse to enforce judgments. Professor Paulsen has elsewhere defended a presidential power to refuse to enforce judgments that the President believes are unconstitutional. 144 Chris
Moore and I have elsewhere defended a somewhat lesser presidential power to refuse to enforce judgments when the President believes with a very high degree of confidence that they are 144 See Paulsen, supra note 56.
unconstitutional. 145 In either case, the President has some degree of power to ensure that the judicial decisionmaking process stays within proper bounds.
Neither of these methods of control, of course, is as sweeping or as easy to implement as Professor Paulsen's statute. But that is the Framers' fault -or, perhaps, their wisdom.
145 See Lawson & Moore, supra note 26, at 1324-29.
